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THE TROPICS EXPLOITED: RISK
PREPAREDNESS AND CORPORATE
SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY IN OFFSHORE
ENERGY DEVELOPMENT
By: Nadia B. Ahmad*
ABSTRACT
Soaring energy demands and increasing technological innovation
have led to the rapid exploitation of offshore oil and gas exploration
and development. This Article seeks to examine elements of risk
preparedness and corporate social responsibility in the context of the
underwater natural gas pipeline in the Eastern Caribbean and the ex-
ploration of Florida’s potential offshore energy reserves. I discuss these
two case studies to illustrate the prevalence of emerging regional energy
corridors in previously unfathomable tropical and subtropical locales
known for tourism-intensive commercial activity. While images of envi-
ronmental degradation of the 2010 BP oil spill remain entrenched in the
collective consciousness, oil and gas operators are continuing to forge
ahead with developing natural resource plays. This Article outlines an
agenda for managing the inevitable exploitation of natural resources
through sustainable development principles.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Soaring energy demands and increasing technological innovation
have led to the rapid exploitation of offshore oil and gas exploration
and development. This Article seeks to examine elements of risk
preparedness and corporate social responsibility in the context of the
underwater natural gas pipeline in the Eastern Caribbean and the ex-
ploration of Florida’s potential offshore energy reserves. I discuss
these two case studies to illustrate the prevalence of emerging energy
corridors in previously unfathomable tropical and subtropical locales
known for tourism-intensive commercial activity. While images of en-
vironmental degradation of the 2010 BP oil spill remain entrenched in
the collective consciousness, oil and gas operators are continuing to
forge ahead with developing natural resource plays. This Article out-
lines an agenda for managing the inevitable exploitation of natural
resources through sustainable development principles.
While public hesitation exists against offshore energy development,
oil and gas exploration can be achieved in a more sustainable manner
with effective regulatory schema. A realization of corporate social re-
sponsibility and planning geared toward risk preparedness instead of
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risk management after disaster strikes provides a preliminary frame-
work for conducting a cost-benefit analysis. I would like to explore
techniques for sustainable exploration and development of offshore
energy resources, as well as ways to engage the local, state, and re-
gional groups.  First, I will discuss the Eastern Caribbean Gas Pipeline
Project and then turn toward offshore energy development in Florida.
II. ANALYSIS OF THE EASTERN CARIBBEAN GAS
PIPELINE PROJECT
Developers plant to break ground on a 600-mile network of under-
sea natural gas pipelines starting from Tobago northward to five other
islands including Barbados, Martinique, St. Lucia, Guadeloupe and
Dominica.1 While the initial construction phase is expected to start in
2013, the proposal and planning stage of the project has generated
little attention to date outside of the region.  These tropical Caribbean
paradises will benefit from the development of energy resources
which will assist them in their electricity generation and serve as a
means to alleviate regional poverty and promote sustainable growth.
Given the magnitude of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of
Mexico in 2010, projects developers should proceed with caution on
this underwater gas pipeline network. If environmentalists aim to
thwart this project, they face an uphill battle.
This Article will be the first to explore the Eastern Caribbean gas
pipeline from an academic and legal scholarship perspective. I would
like to examine elements of risk preparedness in the context of corpo-
rate social responsibility. Researchers, scientists, policy makers, politi-
cians, and businessman have to work within a legal framework, but at
the same time they must keep on an eye on the triple bottom line. The
potential for great environmental harm and degradation is very high
with the Eastern Caribbean gas pipeline. Ideally renewable energy
should be pursued in the ocean, coastal, and in-stream areas. Yet al-
ternative energy sources will not be viable energy sources to meet ris-
ing energy demands for at least thirty to fifty years. So while this
project is beyond the stage of feasibility studies, the project presents
an opportunity for engaging in corporate social responsibility prac-
tices during the construction phase and beyond, i.e. starting off on the
right foot, not after disaster strikes.
A. Background Project Information on Eastern
Caribbean Gas Pipeline
The Infrastructure Development Partnership (IDP) will assemble a
program to deliver a commercial architect agreement, undertake risk
1. Linda Hutchinson-Jafar, Trinidad Moving Ahead with Caribbean Gas Pipeline,
GUYANA CHRON., Feb. 20, 2003, available at http://www.landofsixpeoples.com/
news301/nc302205.htm.
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analysis to ensure a commercially viable and financeable project, as-
semble a team of financial advisors and legal and finance counsel,
structure baseline project agreements, and help with funding initia-
tives.2 Issues with financing and multilateral agreements between the
involved parties may have prevented the project from moving forward
initially because of the number of countries involved. R. Gregory Rich
is the CEO of the Eastern Caribbean Gas Pipeline Company Ltd
(ECGPC).3 The shareholders of ECGPC are Guardian Holdings Lim-
ited, Trinidad and Tobago Unit Trust Corporation, National Gas Com-
pany of Trinidad and Tobago Limited, and the Intra-Caribbean Gas
Pipeline Company Limited.4 An economic feasibility study on the
pipeline in 2004 demonstrated that the project was commercially
viable.5
The project is “the most significant economic co-operation venture
in the history of the Caribbean.”6 When Prime Minister of Trinidad
and Tobago Patrick Manning went public at the Caricom Heads of
Government meeting in August 2002, many skeptics described the
project as a pipedream.7 Undaunted by negative comments and
buoyed by the results of a prefeasibility study, the project initiators,
local firm Intra Caribbean Gas Pipeline Company (ICGPC) pro-
ceeded to seek more private sector partners for the project, including
Saipem, an Italian engineering firm engaged in offshore construction,
onshore construction, liquid natural gas, and drilling.8
Some key technical considerations included the coral reef ecosys-
tems, the volcanic and earthquake activity in the zone, and the possi-
ble impact of hurricane waves.9 From the standpoint of the
consumers, the most important economic parameter is the delivery of
natural gas under a pricing regime that is competitive, predictable,
and non-volatile.10 On both technical and economic grounds the study
indicates that the project is commercially viable. Geopolitical issues,
including the historic penchant for insular haggling within Caricom,
have plagued other regional economic co-operation projects and cast
2. Eastern Caribbean Gas Pipeline, INFRASTRUCTURE DEV. P’SHIP (IDP), http://
www.infradev.co.uk/Eastern-Caribbean-Gas-Pipeline.htm.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Eastern Caribbean Gas Pipeline Project Accomplishes Major Milestone, ALEX-
ANDER’S OIL & GAS CONNECTIONS (Sept. 12, 2004), http://www.gasandoil.com/news/
2004/10/ntl44030.
6. Id.
7. Id. The projected pipeline does not go beyond 2,000 meters at its maximum
depth.
8. See id. Within recent times, Saipem was the lead contractor on the famous
Blue Stream project, the world’s largest under-water pipeline. The Blue Stream runs
775 km from Southern Russia to Turkey across the Black Sea, reaching water depths
of over 2,150 meters. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
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a dark shadow over this one as well.11 The main consumers are the
electric utilities in the various islands, most of which are already
strong commercially viable entities. The ultimate beneficiaries are the
people of the islands, a point which the politicians should not ignore.12
Manning, though, has assured that the decision to go ahead with the
Eastern Caribbean Gas Pipeline project would not rule out the possi-
bility of a larger pipeline, involving Venezuela, being built in the Car-
ibbean Sea.13 Manning proposed the pipeline, which he said would
significantly reduce energy costs in the Caribbean islands and allow
them to develop their economies based on low-priced clean fuel.14
Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez asked that his country join with
Trinidad and Tobago in building a pipeline that would not only serve
the Eastern Caribbean but also extend north as far as Miami with off-
shoots to Jamaica and Cuba.15 The Trinidad and Tobago government
agreed to work with the Venezuelans on the project but have been
wary that they did not want their own project to be bogged down in
what is a far more challenging technical and commercial venture.16
Manning said that the pipeline would cost $700 million to build and
that it was likely the Trinidad and Tobago Government through one of
its agencies that would build and operate the pipeline.17
B. Interconnection of Energy Resources in the Caribbean Region
In the Final Report on Caribbean Regional Electricity Generation,
Interconnection, and Fuels Supply Strategy submitted to the World
Bank, it is noted that “the goal of reducing dependence on high price
imported oil products and the goal of reducing environmental impacts
and increasing the integration of the region” are “complementary.”18
In the Eastern Caribbean, the benefit of interconnection is apparent
when one country possesses “a source of low cost power and its neigh-
11. Id.
12. Id. The National Gas Company is expected to be involved in the project as the
possible gas seller and equity holder. The major responsibility of the Governments
seems to be the legal framework that would govern the passage of the pipeline from
one territory to another. Barbados already has a gas distribution system serving over
12,000 residential, commercial, and industrial customers, but there are concerns for
the dwindling reserve base. The pipeline would open opportunities for local distribu-
tion in all the islands including Tobago which can be connected en-route. Id.
13. Curtis Williams, Trinidad & Tobago Eastern Caribbean Gas Pipeline by 2007,
TRINI. EXPRESS (Oct. 24, 2004), http://www.latinpetroleum.com/cgi-bin/artman/exec/
view.cgi?archive=17&num=3748&printer=1.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Nexant, Caribbean Regional Electricity Generation, Interconnection, and Fuels
Supply Strategy: Final Report, submitted to the World Bank, Mar. 2010, http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2011/02/08/00011
2742_20110208142646/Rendered/PDF/594850Final0Report.pdf
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bor does not.”19 The primary renewable energy sources in the region
are geothermal, wind, and small-scale hydroelectric.20 However, inad-
equate technology and infrastructure exist for renewable energy
sources to be short-term solutions to meet existing energy demands.
Natural gas reserves will bridge the gap until the technology, infra-
structure and policies are developed for alternative energy sources.
For sustainable regional economic growth, the natural gas reserves are
the most practicable energy option, especially when the infrastructure
for interconnecting its supply exists.
III. PRIORITY ON CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY (CSR)
A. The Profit Motive
A longstanding misconception that a corporation’s duty to maxi-
mize profits trumps other considerations including human develop-
ment, social responsibility, and environmental stewardship has created
a cyclical problem that is only festered by many academics.21 The issue
of CSR remains because managers “do want to engage (or at least
appear to engage) in CSR, arguing (in the face of the evidence) that
this is in the ‘long run’ benefit of the shareholders.22  Reuven S. Avi-
Yonah explains the three approaches to CSR:
The first type of CSR involves activities that can clearly and demon-
strably benefit shareholders in the long run. For example, actions
that prevent environmental disasters or comply with legal and ethi-
cal rules can have a significant positive effect in preventing disas-
trous corporate calamities, even if they cost money in the short run.
Thus, even proponents of the aggregate theory, the currently domi-
nant theory of the corporation in academic circles, would support
this type of CSR.
The second type of CSR involves activities that are designed to miti-
gate social harms the corporation was responsible for, even when
there is no direct legal responsibility, and when no benefit to the
shareholders can be shown. Under the aggregate theory, such activi-
ties should not be permitted because they do not benefit sharehold-
ers. But under the artificial entity theory, since it emphasizes the
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Cyclical Transformations of the Corporate Form: A
Historical Perspective on Corporate Social Responsibility, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 767,
814–15 (2005). “From Theodore Levitt’s classic 1958 article on ‘The Dangers of Social
Responsibility’ to Milton Friedman’s influential New York Times magazine article in
1970, to current writings by Michael Jensen and others, the  consensus is that ‘social
responsibility of business . . . [is] to increase its profits.’ The reasons given are first,
that since management are deploying the shareholders’ money, they should not be
permitted to do so in ways that do not directly benefit the shareholders; and second,
that permitting more than one measure of managerial success would enhance the
agency cost problem and make it impossible to evaluate managers with any reasona-
ble degree of objectivity.” Id.
22. Id. at 770.
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benefits of corporate existence derived from the state, an implicit
contract can be inferred that the corporation will help the state in
mitigating harms that it causes even in the absence of legal responsi-
bility. Otherwise, the state will have to bear this burden imposed by
the corporation it created.
Finally, the third type of CSR involves activities like AIDS preven-
tion, for which the corporation is not responsible and which in most
cases do not benefit its shareholders, even in the long run. This type
of CSR would not be permitted under the aggregate or artificial
entity theories. But under the real entity theory, since the corpora-
tion is regarded as a person just like individuals, it is permitted to
act philanthropically just like individuals are, and should, in fact, be
praised to the extent it does so.23
Modern economic theory addresses the old divide between
stakeholderists and stockholderists showing that “corporate decision
makers have both the duty and power to reconcile conflicting interests
on a constant basis.”24 However, “multiple considerations, ambiguity
and uncertainty” resulting from market pressures and the corporate
culture make managers untrustworthy.25
Managers and business leaders should concede, though, that ad-
dressing a problem through risk prevention on the front-end is better
than cleaning up in the wake of a spill’s aftermath. Adaptation in
terms of research and implementation is not only more cost-effective
than remediation, but many of the solutions are win-win opportunities
that would benefit the Eastern Caribbean region with or without look-
ing at climate change.26 In most cases, addressing the existing
problems to the region’s environment and biodiversity will not only
improve the resilience of the ecosystems and well-being of communi-
ties today, but will also place them in a better position to “weather the
storm” of climate change.27
B. Improving Communication between Stakeholders
and Corporations
Organizations like the Port of Spain, Trinidad-based non-profit Car-
ibbean Natural Resources Institute (CANARI) are essential to im-
proving dialogue between stakeholders and corporate entities.28 Often
times the indigenous communities believe that their local natural re-
sources are being exploited and squandered by corporate elites, espe-
23. Id. at 814–15.
24. Amir N. Licht, The Maximands of Corporate Governance: A Theory of Values
and Cognitive Style, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 649, 717–18 (2004).
25. Id.
26. Carribean Natural Resources Institute, Climate Change in the Caribbean: The
Case for Greater Investment in Research and Adaptive Policies, CANARI POLICY BRIEF
NO.10 (2008), http://www.canari.org/docs/CANARI%20PB%2010%20English.pdf.
27. Id.
28. CANARI, http://www.canari.org/.
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cially when the local population cannot visualize tangible direct
benefits either socially or economically. Stakeholder participation
should not be a trend or afterthought but a process that occurs in the
early phases of planning. The Eastern Caribbean Gas Pipeline project
has primarily been engaged in economic and logistic planning to gen-
erate buzz in the industry and support at the national levels. However,
for this pipeline project to succeed long term, local stakeholders need
to be engaged in the dialogue. From the tour groups, local fishermen,
hotel and resort workers and company executives, municipal govern-
ments, religious communities, environmental groups and others have
to be drawn in so that the construction of the pipeline is a par-
ticipatory process, not a future conflict.
Improved communication between policymakers and scientists will
be essential for this process to work effectively for mutual benefits.29
The need for more effective communication also exists between scien-
tists, policy-makers, and communities.30 Stakeholder identification
and analysis are critical first steps in a participatory planning process
and constitute an area where a rigorous approach can be applied.31
Stakeholder analysis is often undertaken late in a planning and man-
agement process, in response to a crisis.32 Yet early identification and
analysis exercises can help deter such crises.33 Within the context of
the specific management issues to be addressed, stakeholder identifi-
cation and analysis provide a basic understanding of the social and
institutional context in which the planning process will take place.34
C. The Ruggie Principles
The various nations involved in the pipeline project, including Trini-
dad and Tobago, Barbados, Martinique, St. Lucia, Guadeloupe, and
Dominica, should explore options to enforce corporate social respon-
29. CANARI, supra note 26.
30. Id.
31. Yves Renard, Guidelines for Stakeholder Identification and Analysis: A Man-
ual for Caribbean Natural Resource Managers and Planners, CARIBBEAN NATURAL
RESOURCES INSTITUTE, (2004), http://www.canari.org/documents/Guidelines5-Guide-
linesforstakeholderidentificationandanalysis.pdf. Jacques Chevalier, Stakeholder
Analysis and Natural Resources Management (June 2001), http://www1.worldbank.
org/publicsector/politicaleconomy/November3Seminar/Stakehlder%20Readings/SA-
Chevalier.pdf. “[Stakeholder Analyses (SA)] is usually committed to enhancing stake-
holder involvement in [natural resources] management processes. Yet not all SA are
carried out through participatory methods. As in much of the management literature
devoted to this topic . . . . SA is frequently done independently from the actors, prior
to their actual involvement in decision-making activities. No stakeholder participation
is sought when answering a critical question—i.e., ‘who decides on the purpose of the
analysis and who counts most?’ . . . Since stakeholder identification is a consequential
matter, analyses done without participation are likely to reflect the interests and
agenda of the agency directing the exercise in social assessment.”
32. Renard, supra note 31, at 9.
33. Id.
34. Id.
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sibility by fortressing liability limits and by incentivizing sustainable
and environmentally-friendly construction and management practices.
UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of
human rights and transnational corporations and other business enter-
prises, John Ruggie, summarizes his work from 2005 to 2011, in
“Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing
the United Nations ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework”
(“Ruggie Principles”).35 The key to corporate social responsibility is
having the corporations onboard as willing participants in Agenda
Item 3 of the 17th Session of the UN Human Rights Council, which
works for the promotion and protection of all human rights, civil, po-
litical, economic, social and cultural rights, including the right to
development.
The Ruggie Principles are well drafted, but criticisms of these prin-
ciples from environmentalists and social policy advocates are that
these principles do not go far enough with respect to seeking corpo-
rate responsibility. While this argument is fair, the Ruggie Principles
are a decent starting point to begin the discussion on CSR and serve
as a launch pad for the hopes of achieving and maintaining a standard
for CSR with respect to human rights, environmental conservation,
and indigenous input. Appeasing the environmentalists and the non-
governmental organizations (NGO), who are already willing to work
towards better human rights, is not particularly productive. The Rug-
gie Principles target corporations, which are the number-one public
hindrance in terms of pollution, corruption, bureaucracy, self-dealings,
insider trading, and profiteering.
I would argue, though, that the Ruggie Principles are a handmaiden
for corporate social responsibility. According to The Collins English
Dictionary, a handmaiden is “a person or thing that serves a useful but
subordinate purpose.”36 The more negative connotation for a hand-
maiden suggests that the Ruggie Principles are submissive to corpo-
rate demands and serve an alternate purpose: feeding the desire to be
socially responsible without actually being so. The Ruggie Principles
were designed so that multinationals would have the fortitude to em-
brace CSR tenets. The Ruggie Principles do not go far enough be-
cause of the leniency embedded in the language. Staff Attorney at
EarthRights International Jonathan Kaufman offers a more piercing
critique of the Ruggie Principles: “I sympathize with the desire to re-
main neutral by opting out of the controversy, but in fact there is no
way to predict how policymakers and arbiters will use and interpret
35. John Ruggie, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing
the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, A/HRC/17/31, 1
(March 21, 2011), http://www.ohchr.org/documents/issues/business/A.HRC.17.31.pdf.
36. COLLINS ENGLISH DICTIONARY–COMPLETE AND UNABRIDGED (6th ed. 2003).
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the gaps in the ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ framework.  In this
situation, silence will not be construed as neutrality.”37
Ruggie was commissioned by the United Nations not by multina-
tional corporations, so it is surprising that he would be so indulgent in
facilitating a discussion on CSR. For critical change, critical dialogue is
crucial. By peddling to the corporate culture, CSR falls on the wayside
with the Ruggie Principles so that the corporations can have the
fac¸ade of CSR. The Ruggie Principles are a bureaucratic attempt at
CSR even though Ruggie has an eye on motivating corporations on
their own accord instead of based on regulations and strict govern-
ment standards. While the remediation and grievance clauses appear
vague and arbitrary, this is the result of deference to the corporate
mindset, which tends to shy away from rigid standards, rather than the
result of sloppiness. Corporations in the abstract sense do not want
arm-twisting; they want to do something because that change would
help their bottom line and improve their public image, which is pre-
cisely what the Ruggie Principles do while failing to hit hard at the
more pressing issues of CSR. In the future, working groups to develop
on the Ruggie Principles, such criticisms have to be further addressed.
D. Dutch Disease Phenomenon
The Eastern Caribbean nations cannot give away their natural re-
sources and have less money to construct and maintain infrastructure,
schools, and other facilities.38 In negotiating contracts, the countries
must also consider the possibility of disastrous environmental spills
and leaks and develop emergency cleanup plans. Engaging all the
stakeholders is key because of the complexity in governance struc-
tures.39  The rate of growth for the oil and gas industry should be of
concern as to how it impacts existing industries. In the 1970s and early
1980s a trend emerged where after the discovery of oil in the North
Sea the Dutch noticed the rest of their economy had slowed.40 This
phenomenon, termed “Dutch disease,” refers to how resource-rich
countries that sell their natural resources experience currency appreci-
ation, causing other exports to be more difficult to trade.41 In Making
Globalization Work, Joseph E. Stiglitz argues that the prevalence of
37. Jonathan Kaufman, Ruggie’s Guiding Principles Fail to Address Major Ques-
tions of Obligations and Accountability, EARTHRIGHTS INTERNATIONAL (April 5,
2001), http://www.earthrights.org/blog/ruggies-guiding-principles-fail-address-major-
questions-obligations-and-accountability.
38. Joseph E. Stiglitz, MAKING GLOBALIZATION WORK 141 (2007).
39. See Hari M. Osofsky, Multidimensional Governance and the BP Deepwater
Horizon Oil Spill, 63 FLA. L. REV. 1077, 1137 (2011). “Approaching multidimensional
governance better requires: (1) creating an openness to designing hybrid structures
that integrate the complex dynamics, (2) examining inclusive and often multiscalar
governance strategies for doing so, and (3) building in a capacity to adapt to change.”
40. Stiglitz, supra note 38, at 148.
41. Id.
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Dutch disease favors the creation of stabilization funds so that coun-
tries can save money when prices are high and spend money when the
countries experience a recession.42 Stiglitz offers the example of Azer-
baijan, which created such a stabilization fund in 2001 and by the end
of 2003 had more than $800 million invested into the stabilization fund
from its oil revenues.
Concerns against corruption, bribery, and unethical lobbyists run
high in the Eastern Caribbean communities. The communities should
not allow emotional hang-ups with respect to corporate greed to pre-
vent development of their natural resources in a sustainable manner.
Each nation should require a stabilization fund be set up so that re-
source wealth is not squandered, because easy money leads to easy
spending,43 as well as poor spending. The natural gas and, potentially,
oil in the Eastern Caribbean region has been there for centuries un-
tapped. A rush to extract these resources is unnecessary, but the peo-
ple of these coastal and island regions should not allow these
resources to sit idle in reserve for future needs.
E. Factoring Environmental Externalities
Security of energy supply presents a number of issues. The Organi-
sation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) was
created pursuant to Article I of the Convention signed in Paris in 1960
and enacted in 1961 to effectuate economic progress among member
nations on a global platform. OECD’s three primary policies are de-
signed to: (1) “to achieve the highest sustainable economic growth and
employment and a rising standard of living in Member countries,
while maintaining financial stability, and thus to contribute to the de-
velopment of the world economy;” (2) “to contribute to sound eco-
nomic expansion in Member as well as non-member countries in the
process of economic development;” and (3) “to contribute to the ex-
pansion of world trade on a multilateral, non-discriminatory basis in
accordance with international obligations.”44
The International Energy Agency’s report indicates that OECD
countries have “a continuing concern about security of energy supply,
which . . . include energy security defined as self-sufficiency, wartime
capability, minimization of adjustment lags, reduced import depen-
dency (especially oil dependency), and price stability.”45 A study by
The World Bank of thirty hydrocarbon-producing countries—includ-
ing Ecuador, Mexico, Trinidad and Tobago, and Bolivia during
1992–2005—found that countries that receive large revenues from hy-
42. Id.
43. Id. at 145.
44. International Energy Agency, TAXING ENERGY: WHY AND HOW, Organisa-
tion for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD), 1993, 141 (vol. 19 1993).
45. Id.
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drocarbons raise less revenue from other domestic taxes.46 The coun-
tries involved in the Eastern Caribbean Gas Pipeline project will have
to be careful and take steps to diversify their economies so that the
fossil fuel industry does not dominate. These Caribbean nations
should address tax considerations.
If a tax or similar levy were attributed to each tonne of CO2 emis-
sions, the cost of using fuels would increase.47 This price increase
would widen the economic window for technologies that produce
lower or no CO2 emissions.48 For countries with low demand, the fuel
prices are high even when coal fuels some of the least-cost genera-
tion.49 For Antigua and Barbuda, Grenada, and St. Vincent and Gren-
adines, the preferred fuel was determined to be distillate as opposed
to coal.50 The renewable energy resources that were cost prohibitive
previously are now “somewhat more economic,” and those that were
not have also become “closer to being competitive.”51 Meanwhile, for
countries with medium or high demand, the fossil fuels are much less
expensive than distillate, so the displaced generation is lower in cost,
which narrows the economic window for alternatives.52 For the Do-
minican Republic, Jamaica, and Jamaica North, incorporating CO2
costs in the analysis would probably eliminate coal’s advantage over
liquid natural gas (LNG) or increase LNG’s advantage over coal.53
With no CO2 cost the renewables that were economic for the islands
with small demand remain economic, but “only marginally so” in
some cases.54 Incorporating CO2 costs as an environmental externality
makes renewable energy options more competitive.
Electricity prices in the Caribbean may be as much as six or seven
times higher than in the United States.55 These high energy costs from
imports hinder competitiveness and increase macroeconomic vulnera-
bility.56 Impending economies of scale in sea transport (240,000 m3)
46. Emily Sinnott, John Nash, & Augusto de la Torre, Natural Resources in Latin
America and the Caribbean: Beyond Booms and Busts?, THE WORLD BANK, 41, http:/
/siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLAC/Resources/257803-1284336216058/FlagshipRe-
port.pdf.
47. Nexant, supra note 18, at 15-5.
48. Id. Nexant investigated the impact if a cost of US$50/tonne were attributed to
CO2 emissions. “At US$50/tonne, the effective price of fuels would increase in a
range from US$2.52 for distillate to US$4.41 for coal, representing increases ranging
from 15% for distillate to 91% for the lowest cost coal for the [islands that were
examined].” Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Juan Benavides, Conference on the Caribbean: A 20/20 vision (June 19, 2007),
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTOECS/Resources/Energy-JBenavides.pdf
(PowerPoint presentation).
56. Id.
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will cut costs, enlarge global gas markets, and increase competition.57
Trinidad and Tobago was the seventh-largest exporter of LNG in
2003.58 To have a sustained presence abroad implies “switching to a
new array of marketing, innovative contracting and hedging strategies
[to] engage community stakeholders and draw upon principles of cor-
porate social responsibility.”59
F. Market Disorder in Natural Gas Transport
Market disorder describes the “distortions that have developed in
the natural gas market.”60 The price of natural gas has increased
steadily over the past three decades despite oversupply.61 Pipeline
suppliers in the United States appear to have overlooked lower-cost
natural gas while acquiring more expensive supplies, including im-
ported LNG.62 The failure to seek lower-cost natural gas previously
led to “markets permanently lost to alternate fuels and conserva-
tion.”63 However, in the Eastern Caribbean nations where natural gas
is not as readily available as it is in the United States, the shift to using
LNG is more understandable.  Meanwhile, the region must seek out
renewable energy as it develops the Eastern Caribbean Gas Pipeline.
Mogel and Gregg argue that “when the price of natural gas surpasses
that of fuel oil, large industrial and commercial users of natural gas
have the ability and incentive to switch to the cheaper fuel, thus exac-
erbating the current natural gas glut.”64
Natural gas pipelines are both transporters and resellers of natural
gas.65 As transporters, natural gas pipelines operate as contract carri-
ers serving natural gas owners, typically industrial users.66 As resellers
of the natural gas that they purchase and transport, pipelines are the
link between producers and end-users.67 In this role, pipelines essen-
tially function as brokers because they effectively match demand with
available supplies.68 The ability to manage and control the flow of nat-
ural gas resources gives the pipeline industry a huge responsibility.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. William A. Mogel & John P. Gregg, Appropriateness of Imposing Common
Carrier Status on Interstate Natural Gas Pipelines, 25 ENERGY L.J. 21, 27 (2004). “Af-
ter a decade of soaring oil prices and a lesser period of natural gas shortages, a natural
gas surplus and declining oil prices are manifest in the early 1980’s. Like past natural
gas shortages which partly resulted from U.S. government regulation that kept inter-
state prices at an artificially low level, the present natural surplus also results from
federal regulation or ‘deregulation’ under the NGPA.” See id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 49.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
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The pipeline industry must also be corporate stewards of the envi-
ronment and take it upon itself to contribute toward human develop-
ment projects instead of only filling the corporate profit coffers.
Generally oil and gas industry executives tend to be highly educated
and socially conscientious, but goals for poverty alleviation and envi-
ronmental conservation carelessly fall at the wayside when analyzing
the diameters of the pipeline and increasing pressure flows. Concern
over the livelihood of local and indigenous stakeholders should be
paramount to fretting over the engineering and geophysics of the
pipeline.
G. Pipeline Safety: Drug and Alcohol Rules
While the natural gas industry has no basis to believe a drug-abuse
problem exists among pipeline personnel, drug-use statistics in the
general population are cause for concern.69 The United States consid-
ered rules that “require mandatory drug testing of employees before
employment, after accidents, whenever there is reasonable cause to
believe an employee is using a prohibited drug, after rehabilitation,
and randomly.”70  The Eastern Caribbean nations should also con-
sider implementing stringent rules on the use of drugs and alcohols by
pipeline personnel.
The American regulations prohibit covered employees from using
alcohol while on duty, four hours before duty, and eight hours after an
accident, and employees are prohibited from working on “covered
functions” whenever the employee’s blood alcohol concentration is
greater than 0.04.71 The rule also requires operators to maintain a
written alcohol misuse plan and to conduct alcohol tests on “covered
employees” after accidents and whenever the operator reasonably
suspects that an employee has violated the prohibitions in the rule.72
H. Concerns for Land Use and Urban Planning
While safety concerns of pipelines traversing lands is critical, proper
planning in concert with community engagement can alleviate or at
least reduce these issues. In 1984, in response to an investigation of a
liquid pipeline accident near a residential area, the National Transpor-
tation and Safety Board (NTSB) issued the following guidelines to
improve public safety as it relates to people near pipelines, including:
(1) instituting restrictions on the use of land adjacent to pipelines;
(2) imposing requirements on pipeline operators to inform prospec-
tive users about the existence and potential hazards of nearby pipe-
69. Paul Biancardi & Lisa M. Bogardus, From “Command and Control” to Risk
Management: The Evolution of the Federal Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Program, 16
ENERGY L.J. 461, 472–73 (1995).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 473.
72. Id.
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lines; (3) studying the role of federal, state, and local governments
concerning land use planning for land adjacent to pipelines; and (4)
determining the types of information that should be communicated
to prospective users about adjacent pipelines.73
The NTSB recommended that the Transportation Research Board
(TRB) of the National Academy of Sciences assess the adequacy of
existing public policy for surface and subsurface use of land adjacent
to pipelines that transport hazardous commodities and develop a pol-
icy to improve the public policy where found deficient in protecting
the public safety.74
The Eastern Caribbean Gas Pipeline project is already more than
the pipedream because the financing and government agreements
have been put in motion, but for this project to succeed and be an
example to the world of natural resources development and transport,
the multinational companies involved in the project and their subsidi-
ary companies must incorporate CSR principles not for the sake of
appearing a good corporate citizens but the purpose of actually being
that ideal corporate steward. Limited natural resources and the impe-
tus to slow rates of climate change cannot demand otherwise. The
Eastern Caribbean Gas Pipeline Project serves as example for Florida
what the right political will and economic motivation can accomplish
if there is an eye toward sustainability. The next section discusses
prospects for Florida’s offshore energy development.
IV. LEGAL ANALYSIS OF FLORIDA’S OFFSHORE
ENERGY PROSPECTS
To recover the deep natural gas stores off Florida’s panhandle will
take billions of dollars of investment and five to seven years before
any of this gas ever reaches shore.75 And even then, it will only pro-
vide five percent of Florida’s daily natural gas consumption over a
ten-year period.76 Critics argue that by these numbers, any hopes that
offshore reserves will be able to supply a substantial amount of Flor-
ida’s energy needs are misplaced. With the opening up of energy ex-
ploration offshore California, Florida policymakers are seeking to
reevaluate their ban on offshore activities in state waters.
73. Id. at 477.
74. Id.
75. Jennifer Schwartz, Energy Expert Balletine: Promise of Florida’s Offshore Oil
is Exaggerated (Oct. 30, 2009), http://www.heatingoil.com/blog/energy-expert-ballen-
tine-promise-of-florida%E2%80%99s-offshore-oil-is-exaggerated-1030/. “Thomas
Ballentine finds that the promise of offshore oil and natural gas drilling is ‘vastly
overblown.’”Id.
76. Id.
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A. Brief History of Oil and Gas Exploration in Florida
The Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) Lands Act (OSCLA) of 1953
along with the enactment of the Submerged Lands Act77 resulted
from the Supreme Court decisions in United States v. California, 332
U.S. 19 (1947); United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707 (1950); and United
States v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699 (1950).78 The Legislative purpose be-
hind the Submerged Lands Act was to return the title to submerged
lands to the coastal states that were within the three nautical miles
seaward of their respective coastlines.79
Later the state’s change in its public policy stance against offshore
energy development echoed a seismic shift on the federal level with
the passage of the 1978 amendments to OSCLA, which established
the framework for the modern leasing and regulating structure in the
industry.80 Title II of these amendments provides for “the cancellation
of leases or permits if continued activity is likely to cause serious harm
to life, including fish and other aquatic life.”81 The 1978 amendments
specify that “economic, social, and environmental values of the renew-
able and nonrenewable resources are to be considered in management
of the OCS.”82 The OCSLA governs “drilling or easements necessary
for exploration, development, and production,” and mandates “the
prompt and efficient exploration and development of a lease area.”83
The OCSLA requires the U.S. Department of Interior (DOI) Secre-
tary to develop leasing programs that specify, as precisely as possible,
the size, timing, and location of areas to be evaluated for oil and gas
leasing for the five-year period following the approval of each geo-
graphical area five-year program.84
The 1978 amendments also establish in pertinent part that “[p]rior
to development and pursuant to an oil and gas lease . . . in any area of
the outer Continental Shelf, other than the Gulf of Mexico . . .” the
lessee should provide a development and production plan along with a
statement, which inter alia includes “all environmental and safety safe-
guards to be implemented.”85 Federal law regarding oil and gas devel-
opment and production also incorporates “procedures and standards
77. 43 U.S.C. § 1301 (2007).
78. Michael J. McHale, An Introduction to Offshore Energy Exploration—A Flor-
ida Perspective, 39 J. MAR. L. & COM. 571, 574 (2008).
79. Id.
80. IDP, supra note 4.
81. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, DIGEST OF
FEDERAL RESOURCE LAWS OF INTEREST TO THE U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE,
http://www.fws.gov/laws/lawsdigest/OUTCONT.htmL; Outer Continental Shelf Lands
Act of 1953 (43 U.S.C. 1331–1356, P.L. 212, Ch. 345, August 7, 1953, 67 Stat. 462) as
amended by P.L. 93-627, January 3, 1975, 88 Stat. 2130; P.L. 95-372, September 18,
1978, 92 Stat. 629; and P.L. 98-498, October 19, 1984, 98 Stat. 2296.
82. Id.
83. 43 U.S.C.A. § 1334 (2007).
84. IDP, supra note 4.
85. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, supra note 80.
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for removing a worst case discharge of oil, and for mitigating or
preventing a substantial threat of such a discharge.”86
B. Prospects for Offshore Oil and Gas Reserves:
Managing Uncertainty
The precise amount of offshore oil and gas reserves in the waters is
an unknown variable. Without conducting new geological surveys of
the region with the latest technologies including satellite images, mag-
netometers, gravity meters, and seismic surveys, pinpointing the
amount of reserves available is a guessing game.87 Geologists can now
use seismology methods by sending shockwaves through rock and
sediment layers to evaluate the possibility of resources.88 A more con-
troversial technique involves the detonation of underwater explosives
to detect migration patterns of shockwaves beneath the water sur-
face.89 Advantageous positions are marked using GPS systems, tradi-
tional longitude and latitude markings, and even buoys.90
A 2009 report from the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) confirms
that the U.S. Gulf of Mexico contains “very thick and concentrated
gas-hydrate-bearing reservoir rocks which have the potential to pro-
duce gas using current technology.”91 Recent drilling by a government
and industry consortium indicate that the Gulf of Mexico is “the first
offshore area in the United States with enough information to identify
gas hydrate energy resource targets with potential for gas produc-
tion.”92 What is so telling about this USGS report is that “the discov-
ery of thick gas-hydrate-bearing sands validates the pre-drilling
integrated geological and geophysical approach used to identify the
targets and provides increased confidence in assessing the energy re-
source potential of marine gas hydrates.”93 While the precise amount
of oil and gas reserves is unknown, the USGS reports in combination
with other government and oil and gas industry reports suggest that a
viable potential exists.
Energy development is a complex process, which requires multi-fac-
eted regulation at the state and federal levels. Offshore drilling and
exploration activities do not always occur in neat packages involving a
86. 43 U.S.C.A. § 1351.
87. McHale, supra note 77, at 579.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Significant Gas Resource Discovered in U.S. Gulf of Mexico, U.S. GEOLOGI-
CAL SURVEY (May 29, 2009), http://www.usgs.gov/newsroom/article.asp?ID=2227.
92. Id. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), the U.S. Geological Survey
(USGS), the U.S. Minerals Management Service (MMS), and a group of U.S. and
international energy industry companies under the management of Chevron were re-
sponsible for conducting this first ever drilling project with the goal to collect geologic
data on gas-hydrate-bearing sand reservoirs in the Gulf of Mexico. Id.
93. Id.
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single vessel or platform, but often involve a diverse group of struc-
tures and vessels.94 The technology advances ahead of the regulation;
therefore, new laws should account for changing technologies as much
as possible.
C. Stakeholder Concerns: Weighing the Risks to the Community
The oil and gas companies should develop partnerships with the
government and local communities to “enhance core business
processes, including improving production skills, integrating local ex-
pertise and knowledge into production activities, and complying with
requirements for environmental and social impact assessment and
monitoring.”95 Collaboration should be more than a buzz word.
1. Economic Considerations
The national government vied with the coastal states for marine ju-
risdiction to control and derive offshore oil and gas revenues.96 The
hesitation for offshore energy exploration of the last twenty years is
slowly eroding.  Offshore energy development will lead to more jobs,
but the concern should be also for the skill sets required for jobs cre-
ated. The state government must negotiate its position when allowing
oil and gas companies to explore and drill in state waters. In negotiat-
ing contracts the state must also consider the possibility of disastrous
environmental spills and develop emergency cleanup plans. Engaging
all the stakeholders is key because of the complexity in governance
structures.97 Concerns against corruption, bribery, and unethical lob-
byists run high among the community. The community should not al-
low emotional hang-ups with respect to corporate greed prevent
development of its natural resources in a sustainable manner.
The environmental organization, Save Our Shores, warns of the
threats posed by energy development to the tourism and fishing indus-
tries, citing $3.4 billion in state tax revenues from the $60 billion tour-
ism industry and $5 billion in revenue generation annual from sports
fishing, as well as $6 billion from offshore commercial fishing.98 Save
94. Kenneth G. Engerrand, Primer of Remedies on the Outer Continental Shelf, 4
LOY. MAR. L.J. 19, 40 (2005).
95. Alyson Warhurst, Corporate Citizenship and Corporate Social Investment:
Drivers of Tri-Sector Partnership, BUSINESS PARTNERS FOR DEVELOPMENT (May
2000), available at http://www.greenleaf-publishing.com/content/pdfs/jcc01warh.pdf
(working paper).
96. Milner S. Ball, Good Old American Permits: Madisonian Federalism on the
Territorial Sea and Continental Shelf, 12 ENVTL. L. 623, 627. (1982).
97. “Approaching multidimensional governance better requires: (1) creating an
openness to designing hybrid structures that integrate the complex dynamics, (2) ex-
amining inclusive and often multiscalar governance strategies for doing so, and (3)
building in a capacity to adapt to change.” Hari M. Osofsky, Multidimensional Gov-
ernance and the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, 63 FLA. L. REV. 1077, 1137 (2011).
98. Risks Outweigh Benefits of Drilling, SAVE OUR SHORES (Sept. 25, 2011),
http://www.sosfla.org/2011/02/economic-risks-outweigh-benefits-of.html.
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Our Shores argues that the threat to existing industries and the poten-
tial environmental hazards are not worth the risk.99 The statistics and
data cited by Save Our Shores is misleading because it assumes that
the tourism and fishing industries will vanish as a result of offshore
energy development, which is simply not the case. Further, Save Our
Shores uses data from the Collins Center for Public Policy, which indi-
cates that there are an estimated 236 million barrels of oil and oil
equivalents in state waters.100 This figure is unreliable because only
with nascent technology employed by the energy sector during the ac-
tual exploration phase can more realistic data of the potential fossil
fuel reserves be determined.
The Collins Center for Public Policy prepared a report to the Cen-
tury Commission for a Sustainable Florida which indicated that there
were no plans or procedures for resolving potential conflicts among
oil and gas exploration and development interests and competing uses
of the marine environment besides sand resources and military exer-
cises.101 These competing uses include protection of essential fisheries
habitat, renewable energy development, offshore aquaculture, and sit-
ing of additional liquid natural gas facilities.102 However, marine spa-
tial planning processes are a potential mechanism for resolving these
disputes.103
2. Environmental Concerns
With the ongoing threat of Atlantic hurricanes, disruption of devel-
opment activities is not only a possibility, but a matter of time. Previ-
ous natural disasters caused by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita help the
learning curve in considering energy development in Florida. The
threat of hurricanes is only one risk to be factored, out of many
others. For example, on September 4, 2005, in St. Bernard Parish,
Louisiana, Murphy Oil Company USA, informed the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) approximately 1.05 million gallons of mixed
crude were released as a result of damage from Katrina, affecting
homes, land, and the environment.104
In 2007, the Norwegian Risk Management Company, Det Norske
Veritas, pursuant to contract with the U.S. Department of the Interior,
Mineral Management Service, issued its “Technical Report on Pipe-
line Damage Assessment from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in the
Gulf of Mexico,” noting that the “Hurricanes caused major disruption
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Collins Ctr. for Pub. Policy, Potential Impacts of Oil and Gas Exploration in
the Gulf (2010), available at http://www.collinscenter.org/resource/resmgr/century_
com_oil_drilling/final_oil_draft_-_formatted.pdf.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. McHale, supra note 77, at 583.
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and structural damage to the oil and gas facilities in the Gulf of Mex-
ico and essentially shut down 8% of the nation’s production capabil-
ity.”105  Det Norske Veritas’s report said that from a safety
perspective the discharges were mitigated by “the use of effective shut
off valves, prior planning, evacuation and implementation of Oil Spill
Response Plans.”106 These same safety techniques with improved
technology and other precautions would have to be used by the indus-
try if Florida were to open its shores to energy development.
Environment Florida, a statewide, citizen-based environmental ad-
vocacy organization, states on its website that “drilling for oil off our
coasts is a destructive policy that will put our beaches and wild places
at risk while doing nothing to reduce our dependence on foreign oil or
the cost to consumers at the pump.”107
The Center for Health and Global Environment at Harvard Medi-
cal School published a study that outlines many of the health and en-
vironmental concerns in the industry.108 Energy exploration involves
moving heavy equipment into pristine environmental areas, dis-
rupting—sometimes deforesting—the habitat and allowing human en-
croachment.109 The Harvard study reports that “mercury
contamination of fish has become an increasing route of human expo-
sure to this neurotoxin, believed to cause birth defects, and heart
problems – and more severe neurological disorders (“Minamata dis-
ease”) and death with very high levels.” Citing a study of oil rigs in the
Gulf of Mexico, it was found that mercury levels were up to twelve
times higher than acceptable EPA levels in muds and sediments un-
derneath the platforms.110
Offshore drilling workers still face multiple hazards and report high
levels of stress and anxiety because of long shifts and stressful sched-
ules, combined with wet, slippery conditions, rough seas, and heavy
machinery moving at high velocities.111 The Harvard study also re-
ported that occupationally related fatalities among workers in the oil
and gas extraction process are higher than deaths for workers from all
other U.S. industries combined.112 These grim reports should not dis-
suade energy exploration offshore, but should serve as a teachable
moment to implement sustainable development strategies.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. 2010 Annual Report, ENV’T FLA., http://www.environmentflorida.org/sites/en-
vironment/files/2010-Annual-Report_Environment-Florida_1.pdf (last visited May 27,
2013).
108. Center for Health and the Global Environment, Oil: A Life Cycle Analysis of
its Health and Environmental Impacts, HARV. SCH. PUB. HEALTH, available at http://
chge.med.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/oilfullreport.pdf.
109. Id. at 9.
110. Id. at 12.
111. Id. at 13.
112. Id.
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D. Sustainable Development and Offshore Energy Development
Sustainable development, as defined in Our Common Future, also
known as the Brundtland Report, “is development that meets the
needs of the present without compromising the ability of future gener-
ations to meet their own needs.”113 Sustainable development encom-
passes two principles: (1) “the concept of needs, in particular the
essential needs of the world’s poor, to which overriding priority
should be given;” and (2) “the idea of limitations imposed by the state
of technology and social organization on the environments ability to
meet present and future needs.”114 The United Nations Environment
Programme expanded this definition of sustainable development so
that the concept also requires “the maintenance, rational use, and en-
hancement of the natural resource base that underpins ecological re-
silience and economic growth, and that it implies progress towards
international equity.”115
1. Lifting of the Liability Cap
Sustainable development is what creates successful companies that
have serious longevity and financial viability. The public must be con-
fident in the oil and gas industry’s plan for energy development. One
way to achieve that confidence or restore it is through environmental
laws. Aside from protecting the environment, environmental laws act
to reassure the public “that needed industrial activities can proceed in
a safe and environmentally responsible manner.”116 H.R. 3534, the
Consolidated Land, Energy, and Aquatic Resources (CLEAR) Act,
which passed by the U.S. House of Representatives, covered an array
of energy issues, including Section 702(a), which “would eliminate the
$75 million cap on liability for spills from offshore facilities and would
permit the President to increase other liability caps based on specific
findings.”117 Lifting the liability cap of $75 million is crucial. CLEAR
did not pass in the Senate in 2010 and will likely not be revisited in the
113. WORLD COMM’N ON ENV’T & DEV., OUR COMMON FUTURE 43, (1987), availa-
ble at http://www.un-documents.net/our-common-future.pdf.
114. What is Sustainable Development? Environmental, Economic and Social Well-
Being for Today and Tomorrow, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR SUSTAINABLE DE-
VELOPMENT, available at http://www.iisd.org/sd/#one.
115. F. W. Wellmer & J. D. Becker-Platen, Sustainable Development and the Ex-
ploitation of Mineral and Energy Resources: A Review, 91 INT. J. EARTH SCI. (GEOL
RUNDSCH) 723–45, (Apr. 18, 2002), available at http://bscw-app1.ethz.ch/pub/bscw.cgi/
d163259/Wellmer_BeckerPlaten_2002.pdf. “The next step was the Rio Declaration at
the UN Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 and
Agenda 21, which stresses the three elements of sustainable development – ecology,
economy, and social justice: To conserve the basic needs of life, to enable all people to
achieve economic prosperity, and to strive towards social justice.” Id.
116. John Wyeth Griggs, BP Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill, 32 ENERGY L.J. 57, 74
(2011).
117. Id. at 76.
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future.  A more robust liability provision would have a deterring im-
pact on the industry.118
2. Preparedness for Worst Case Scenario
Since the Exxon Valdez spill in 1989, technology decreasing the
likelihood of spills has not evolved. This lack of progress is directly the
result of inadequate investments in research and development.119 The
industry, government, environmentalists, community, and other stake-
holders must work together to achieve the changes needed to make
energy development safer. The loud voices for environmental con-
cerns and occupation safety have quietly decreased as the Deepwater
Horizon spill becomes more distant in time. In the Tulane Environ-
mental Law Journal, Oliver A. Houck in “Worst Case and the Deep-
water Horizon: There Ought to Be a Law,” points out that
It is the power of environmental groups with technical staffs, in-
dependents, academia, self-taught experts, retirees from agencies
and industry, international colleagues, and the whole panoply of the
“loyal opposition” that keeps majority decisions at least relatively
honest, improves even marginal projects, and makes all of us and
our surroundings a little more secure.120
Both the industry and the government must learn from the Deep-
water Horizon oil spill and not let its lessons be forgotten.121
However, the current efforts to “assess technology through bureau-
cratic analysis of complexity, risk assessment and evaluation, cost-ben-
efit analysis, and the worst case analysis of catastrophes are not
promising when measured against the headlong rush of technological
change.”122 Most Americans are “captured in the thrall of technologi-
cal optimism, with its faith in science, the corresponding belief in pro-
gress, and the resulting affluence.”123 Richard Oliver Brooks suggests
that “we may wish to reconsider our faith in such technological pro-
gress and our capacity to control technology.”124
118. Kenneth M. Murchison, Beyond Compensation for Offshore Drilling Acci-
dents: Lowering Risks, Improving Response, 30 MISS. C. L. REV. 277, 289–90 (2011).
119. Id.
120. Oliver A. Houck, Worst Case and the Deepwater Horizon Blowout: There
Ought to Be a Law, 24 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 18 (2010).
121. In the 381-page report to President Barack Obama released by the National
Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling in January
2011, the Commission proposed that Congress fund more research and development
on oil spill response to improve governmental expertise, that the National Response
Team build governmental ability to estimate flow rates accurately, and that DOI re-
quire oil companies to demonstrate the safety of wells and their component parts and
to have detailed plans for source control in the event of a spill. Osofsky, supra note
95, at 1123.
122. Richard Oliver Brooks, The Gulf Oil Spill: The Road Not Taken, 74 ALB. L.
REV. 489, 513 (2011).
123. Id.
124. Id.
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3. Better Use of Environmental Impact Statements (EIS)
Extraction should include the use of targeted environmental impact
statements (EIS) at the various stages of exploration, development,
and production in the Gulf of Mexico region.125 An EIS should be
prepared in situations where it has not been prepared previously and
where drilling has never occurred.126 An EIS does not have to be an
all-encompassing document, but it should specify unknown vari-
ables.127 Based on the EIS, the decision-maker can act on the basis of
known and unknown environmental consequences.128
The EIS should calculate and assess a worst-case or doomsday sce-
nario instead of an ordinary analysis of routine activities. In Sierra
Club v. Sigler, the Army Corps of Engineers issued five permits for
the construction of a multi-purpose deepwater port and crude oil dis-
tribution system in Galveston Bay, Texas, which would permit super-
tankers to through pass through Galveston Bay’s wildlife estuary.129
The Corps’ Final EIS (FEIS) contained an oil spill analysis which dis-
cussed (1) the probability of an oil spill, (2) the dispersion of an 18,717
gallon oil spill, and (3) the environmental impacts of such a spill. The
FEIS concluded that the project would not increase the probability of
an oil spill, and, if a spill did in fact occur, it “might have a severe local
impact, the impact within Galveston Bay or along the Texas Gulf
Coast would be minor.”130 The Army Corps of Engineers’ FEIS did
not contain a worst-case analysis.131 The court concluded that a worst-
case analysis did not have to be included in the EIS because such an
analysis would not have “meaningfully illuminated the dangers or ma-
terially added to the decision-makers’ awareness of the spectrum of
consequences involved.”132 The court’s reasoning is flawed because
without a complete understanding of complex environmental and nat-
ural disasters, the state and federal government cannot properly assess
an exploration and/or development plan. Requiring the EIS to include
a worst case scenario will also help the oil and gas industry in its risk
management and liability planning.
125. Robert B. Wiygul, The Structure of Environmental Regulation on the Outer
Continental Shelf: Sources, Problems, and the Opportunity for Change, 12 J. ENERGY
NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 75, 179–80 (1992).
126. Id. at 180.
127. William M. Cohen, Environmental Considerations in Outer-Continental Shelf
Oil and Gas Leasing in the United States, 3 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 4–5 (1990).
128. Id.
129. Sierra Club v. Sigler, 695 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1983); Dr. Edward A. Fitzgerald,
The Rise and Fall of Worst Case Analysis, 18 U. DAYTON L. REV. 1, 12–13 (1992).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
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4. Stricter Language for Rejection of Exploration Plan
Robert Wiygul proposes a change in “the language of the test to
permit rejection of an exploration plan if the proposed exploratory
activities would be reasonably likely to result in significant environ-
mental harm.”133 He says that this wording is stricter than the current
standard of activity that “probably cause serious harm or damage to
life.”134 Wiygul understands that the oil and gas industry will not ap-
preciate this change in the standard for permitting exploration plans,
but he argues that if “the necessary homework is done early in the
process, there should very seldom, and possibly never, be instances in
which exploratory activity will be barred as a result of imminent dan-
ger to the environment.”135 If the oil and gas quantities are sufficient
to merit exploration and development, the oil and gas companies will
be willing to abide by more stringent environmental regulations. Best
practices in the industry dictate that a premium is placed on abiding
by and exceeding existing environmental standards. The industry does
not have a vested interest in tarnishing its reputation by being lax with
respect to environmental standards.
5. Restoration Projects for Recycling Retired and Abandoned
Oil and Gas Platforms
Recycling retired natural gas and oil platforms as artificial reefs has
proven to be an effective tool for fishery management.136 The Bureau
of Ocean Energy Management, and Regulation says in its report on
the “History of Rigs-to-Reefs (RTR) Offshore Florida” that fish, fish-
ermen, divers, fishing support industries, coastal communities, and the
petroleum industry have benefited “when retired and obsolete pro-
duction platforms, already popular with offshore fishermen, are
reevaluated and converted for continued use as fishery enhancement
resources in the marine environment.”137 The report cites that approx-
imately 195 petroleum structures have been donated and converted to
permanent reefs in the Gulf of Mexico (GOM) region.138 The Interna-
tional Maritime Organization (IMO), adopted guidelines for the re-
moval of offshore structures on the continental shelf and in the 200
mile area bordering a coastal nation known as the exclusive economic
zone (EEZ).139 The IMO guidelines promote a case-by-case approach
133. Wiygul, supra note 125.
134. Id. at 177–78.
135. Id. at 178.
136. History of Rigs-to-Reefs (RTR) Offshore Florida, BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY
MGMT., REGULATION, & ENFORCEMENT, available at http://www.gomr.boemre.gov/
homepg/offshore/egom/rigsreef.html.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Rachael E. Salcido, Enduring Optimism: Examining the Rig-to-Reef Bargain,
32 ECOLOGY L.Q. 863, 877–78 (2005).
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to the question, considering navigation and impact on the environ-
ment, as well as cost and potential new uses.140
V. CONCLUSION
The sustainable development techniques mentioned in this Article
add to the long conversation on the global energy future, but they are
by no means all-encompassing. Floridians will begrudgingly come to
terms with their beaches’ horizons being invaded by oil rigs whether in
five years or fifty years, but the impetus is on state lawmakers and
energy companies to explain that they will develop Florida’s energy
resources in a sustainable manner, and then do so.
140. Id.
